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Programs/7CR/v15/Gomez.pdf.
INTRODUCTION
Through attempts to implement multiple asylum bans, the zero
tolerance policy, the public charge rule, and, most recently, the
Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), the Trump administration has
arguably made its message clear: immigrants are not welcome.1 The


J.D. candidate, May 2020, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A in Political Science, B.B.A, in Management, Loyola University
Chicago, 2013. A sincere thank you to my former immigrant clients for encouraging
me to embark on a journey I didn’t always envision for myself and to all the
immigration attorneys I have had the honor and privilege of working with. Thanks to
them, I learned that logic and compassion are not mutually exclusive. A special
thank you to Clinical Lecturer Victoria Carmona for her commentary on Pereira
litigation and to Professor Morris for giving Chicago-Kent students the opportunity
to publish.
1
See Priyanka Boghani, A Guide to Some Major Trump Administration
Immigration Policies 10(2019),https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-guIdeto-some-major-trump-administration-immigration-policies. See also: Joel Rose,
Advocates Say President Trump’s Immigration Policy is “A Tool of
Cruelty,10(2019),https://www.npr.org/2019/0/01/765987523/advocates-say-trump-simmigration-plan-creates-nightmarish-situations.
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administration’s constant efforts to change immigration law and policy
have led to prolonged detention, denaturalization, family separation,
and the extreme traumatization of immigrants.2 Given the
administration’s constant attacks on the immigrant community,
advocates unquestionably saw a sliver of hope when the Supreme
Court decided Pereira v. Sessions.3
In Pereira, the Supreme Court held that a government-issued
notice to appear not specifying the time and place of removal
proceedings does not meet the statutory definition of a notice to appear
(“NTA”), under 8 U.S.C. § 1227 and therefore, does not trigger what is
known as the “stop-time rule.”4 The decision seemed straightforward
in one sense: a notice failing to list the time and place of a hearing
could not “stop time” and therefore prevent a noncitizen from accruing
the required physical presence to cancel his removal from the country.5
However, immigrant advocates saw the potential jurisdictional
ramifications involved: if, as the Pereira court declared, an NTA not
listing the date and time of the hearing was an invalid charging
document or summons, then, how could the immigration court vest its
jurisdiction over a noncitizen’s case? Therefore, in direct response to
the Court’s decision, immigrant advocates across the country
challenged and successfully terminated the removal proceedings of at
least 9,000 immigrants in the months immediately following the
2

In June 2018, the Trump administration announced plans to denaturalize at
least 2000 citizens who were suspected of committing fraud. Ingrid Rojas Contreras,
Donald Trump’s Denaturalization task force is New Way to Threaten the American
Dream, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/07/24/donald-trumpdenaturalization-goals-threaten-american-dream-column/815592002.
3
While the federal government estimated that about 3,000 children were
separated from their families as a result of the Trump administration’s zero-tolerance
policy, a new report estimates that at least 700 children were separated from their
families before the policy was formally announced. See Miriam Jordan, Family
Separation May Have Hit Thousands More Migrant Children Than Reported,
(January 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/us/family-separationtrump-administration-migrants.html.
4
Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105(2018).
5
Lonny Hoffman, Pereira’s Aftershock’s 61 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1,5
(2019).
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decision.6 Advocates’ argument was seemingly simple. By statute, an
immigration court vests its subject matter jurisdiction over a case by
serving a charging document (i.e. a notice to appear) and therefore, the
Court’s decision that an incomplete NTA not listing the date and place
of a hearing, was not valid, could be interpreted as denying
immigration courts’ jurisdiction whenever an incomplete notice was
served upon a noncitizen. However, this seemingly simple argument
premised on statutory interpretation has left lower courts and the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) alike struggling to
reach a consensus on how to properly interpret Pereira.7
To determine how broadly or narrowly Pereira should be
construed, both lower courts and the Supreme Court must inevitably
address numerous questions. First, courts must decide whether
immigration court proceedings initiated with a defective NTA are
invalidated due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Secondly, courts
must address whether a two-step process in which a subsequent notice
of hearing containing the missing time and place can, in essence,
“cure” the initial defective notice.8 Still, courts must determine who
can avail themselves of Pereira’s benefits.9 Is Pereira only applicable
to those who are currently in removal proceedings initiated by
defective NTAs?10 Does Pereira allow for anyone with a final removal
order to benefit from being able to challenge an immigration court’s
jurisdiction over their case?11 Furthermore, if a Pereira claim is
allowed, must a person raising such a claim show they were prejudiced
after receiving a defective NTA?12 While courts have begun to address
6

Reade Levinson & Cristina Cooke, US Courts Abruptly Tossed 9000
Deportation Cases. Here’s Why, (October 17, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-terminations/u-s-courtsabruptly-tossed-9000-deportation-cases-heres-why-idUSKCN1MR1HK.
7
Hoffman, supra note 5.
8
Hoffman, Geoffrey, A., Litigation Post-Pereira: Where are We Now? 2
AILA L. J. 135, 135 (October 2019).
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
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some of these issues, rather than providing clear answers, lower
courts’ and the BIA’s decisions have further complicated the analysis
in answering these questions.13
Shortly after the Pereira decision, the Board, attempting to
provide both immigration courts and attorneys with much needed
guidance on Pereira’s implications, limited the decision to
cancellation of removal cases and held that Pereira only addressed the
issue of whether the stop-time rule was triggered by a defective notice
to appear and that immigration courts still had jurisdiction when they
issued defective NTAs.14 Therefore, immigrant advocates could not
challenge immigration courts’ jurisdiction whenever a noncitizen
received a notice not containing the date and time of their removal
proceeding. In addition, the Board held that as long as the courts later
issued a notice of hearing listing the missing information, the
immigration court could vest jurisdiction over the individual’s case.15
The Board, however, did not explicitly state Pereira has no
jurisdictional ramifications.16
As a result, immigration attorneys continued challenging cases
initiated by defective NTAs, arguing for the dismissal or termination
of cases based on the immigration court’s failure to vest jurisdiction.17
They relied on 8 CFR § 1003.14(a), which provides that the
immigration court’s jurisdiction “vests” when a “charging document”
is filed with the immigration court to argue that NTAs not listing the
time and place are not proper charging documents under 8 CFR §
1003.13 and therefore cannot vest the immigration court’s jurisdiction
over the noncitizen’s case.18
Lower courts’ reviews of the challenges brought after BermudezCota, however, only served to complicate everyone’s understanding of
Pereira and immigration law in general. Until recently, there was a
13

Id.
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Levinson & Cooke, supra note 6.
18
8 C.F.R. § 1003.13 (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (2018).
14
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circuit split on whether a Pereira claim, that a defective notice could
not assert jurisdiction over an individual’s claim, was valid.19
Additionally, courts of appeals are still split on many of the questions
that inevitably arise in answering the first question.
Following the Board’s attempt to clarify Pereira’s impact in
Bermudez-Cota, the Second, Sixth, and Ninth circuits deferred to the
Board’s rejection of the jurisdictional argument.20 The Eleventh
Circuit, in ruling on a motion for stay of removal, broke this trend,
reasoning it was not required to defer to the BIA because the agency’s
holding was “based on an unreasonable interpretation of the governing
statutes and regulations.”21
The Seventh Circuit, in Santiago-Ortiz v. Barr agreed with the
Eleventh Circuit and rejected both of Bermudez-Cota’s
conclusions:(1) that Pereira was limited to the question of whether the
stop-time rule is triggered and (2) that the two-step process of serving
a deficient NTA and subsequently issuing a notice of hearing with the
missing date and time was sufficient to be Pereira compliant.22 The
court rejected what it considered to be Bermudez-Cota’s
oversimplification of Pereira saying: “Pereira is not a one-way, oneday train ticket,” and added that the Board “brushed too quickly over
the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira.” 23
19

Katy Lewis, Michelle Mendez, Victoria Neilson, and Rebecca Scholtz,
Practice Advisory: Pereira v. Sessions—Updated Strategies and Considerations
20
See Banegas Gomez v. Barr, No. 15-3269, 2019 WL 1768914, at *6–8 (2d
Cir. Apr. 23, 2019) (holding that jurisdiction vests with the immigration court when
the initial notice to appear does not specify the time and place of the proceedings,
but notices of hearing served later include that information); Karingithi v. Whitaker,
913 F.3d 1158, 1159–62 (9th Cir. 2019) (same); Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911
F.3d 305, 312–15 (6th Cir. 2018) (same).
21
Duran - Ortega v. United States AG, No. 18-14563-D, 2018 U.S. App.
LEXIS 33531 (11th Cir. Nov. 29, 2018)(citing United States v. Zapata-Cortinas,
2018 WL 4770868, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. 2018); United States v. Virgen-Ponce, 320
F.Supp.3d 1164, 1166 (E.D. Wash. 2018), but noting other district courts have
disagreed. See, e.g., United States v. Romero Colindres, 2018 WL 5084877, at *2
(N.D. Ohio 2018)).
22
Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2019).
23
Id. at 961-962.
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The Seventh Circuit then considered what should result from
finding an NTA violated statutory requirements and was therefore
noncompliant with Pereira.24 The court explained that while
“jurisdiction vests” upon the service of an NTA, “jurisdiction”
should not be understood as referring to “jurisdiction” “in the same
sense that complete diversity or the existence of a federal question is
for a district court.”25 Instead, the court interpreted the question of
“jurisdiction” as a “claims-processing rule,” which it defined as a
rule “seek[ing] to promote the orderly progress of litigation by
requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain
specified times.”26 The court noted that failure to comply with a
claims-processing rule may result in termination of a noncitizen’s
removal hearing, meaning a noncitizen could potentially remain in
the country.27 However, a hearing would only be terminated if a
noncitizen timely objected to a defective notice. 28 Without a timely
objection, the noncitizen, would waive or forfeit his objection. 29
The Seventh Circuit’s new approach in interpreting the issuance
of a defective NTA as a violation of a claims-processing rule rather
than a jurisdictional violation has provided immigration attorneys
with a different avenue to contest defective NTAs. Unfortunately,
however, the Seventh Circuit has relied on the reasoning in OrtizSantiago to deny noncitizens’ petitions of review without
necessarily delineating what constitutes a timely objection to a
defective NTA.30 Should a noncitizen make this “timely objection” in
his initial cancellation of removal request before the immigration

24

Id. at 963.
Id. (citing Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011)).
26
Id. at 963.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 958.
29
Id. at 964.
30
See Vidinski v. Barr, No. 18-3413, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 32169 (7th Cir.
Oct. 28, 2019); Vyloha v. Barr, 929 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2019); Shojaeddini v. Barr,
781 F. App’x 545 (7th Cir. 2019); Vyloha v. Barr, 929 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2019).
25
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judge? Should he object to the defective notice after his application for
cancellation is denied and he appeals to the Board?
Without addressing what constitutes a timely objection, the
Seventh Circuit has quickly rejected numerous petitions for review
of Board decisions holding that the noncitizen’s objections were
untimely.31 Importantly, the time element would not be so significant
had the court agreed that serving a defective NTA implicates a lack
of jurisdiction over a case allowing an individual to bring this issue
before a court at virtually any point–unlike a claims-processing
violation. Furthermore, a claims-processing violation, as noted in
Ortiz-Santiago, would allow a court to simply dismiss a noncitizen’s
challenge to a defective notice, on the grounds that the challenge
was not timely.
Overall, while the Seventh Circuit correctly concluded the
notice served on the noncitizen was defective and properly
distinguished the case before it from Pereira, its reasoning in
denying the noncitizen’s petition for review is ultimately flawed.
The distinction between a claims-processing rule and jurisdiction
matters. Defective notices are not clearly merely a violation of a
claims-processing rule as the Seventh Circuit suggests, especially
given ambiguities in the statutes delineating what must be included
in an NTA and how immigration courts vest jurisdiction.32 Ruling
that defective notices are violations of claims-processing not only
potentially diminishes the opportunity of noncitizens to contest their
removal hearing based on government error or idleness, but also
ignores established Supreme Court precedent indicating statutes
should be read in favor of the noncitizen. 33
This note will review the Seventh Circuit’s decision in OrtizSantiago v. Barr and its approach to Pereira. The first section of this
note will provide a brief overview of immigration law pertaining to the
issues involved in Pereira and Ortiz-Santiago; including explanations
31

Id.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 140
L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998) (noting jurisdiction is a word of many meanings).
33
Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948).
32
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of how the government initiates the process of removing a noncitizen
from the United States, how someone in that situation can apply for a
form of relief that would prevent his removal from the country, and the
role the stop-time rule plays in the removal process.
The second section will provide an analysis of Pereira as it relates
to the stop time rule and the potential ramifications the decision has on
noncitizens’ ability to cancel their removal from the country. The third
section will provide a summary and analysis of Ortiz-Santiago. Lastly,
the fourth section will discuss the Seventh Circuit’s approach to
Pereira in Ortiz- Santiago and why it is ultimately flawed.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Initiation of Removal Proceedings Through Notices to
Appear
Article 1 Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants the government
the power to establish a uniform rule on Naturalization.34 To carry out
these duties, 8 U.S.C.§1227 gives the government the power to initiate
removal proceedings against noncitizens who are undocumented or
may have lost their status in the United States.35
Removal proceedings, commonly and previously referred to as
deportation proceedings, are administrative proceedings held to
determine whether noncitizens are can or should be removed from the
United States and whether they are eligible for any relief under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).36 A person is considered
removable from the country if he or she: entered the United States
without being properly admitted or inspected by an immigration
officer; was present in the country unlawfully or stayed in the country
beyond the time permitted by his or her visa; or committed crimes the
34

Edzie, Louisa, Pereira v. Sessions and the Future of Deportation
Proceedings, IMMIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS L. REVIEW 1, 1 (2019).
35
Id. at 1.
36
Removal proceedings were previously and are still commonly referred to as
deportation proceedings or exclusion proceedings.
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government has determined makes a noncitizen deportable or
inadmissible such as having been part of the Nazi or Communist
parties or having an intent to overthrow the government.37
To initiate removal proceedings, the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”) issues administrative summons or charging
documents referred to as a notices to appear (“NTAs”).38 Under 8
U.S.C § 1229, an NTA is a written notice served on noncitizens listing
the nature of the proceedings against the noncitizen, the legal authority
under which the proceedings can be initiated and carried out, the
conduct that is arguably in violation of the law, the charges against the
noncitizen, and the statutory provisions that the noncitizen has
allegedly violated.39Additionally, as held in Pereira, the NTA must list
the time and date of removal hearing.40
While there has been much debate about what constitutes a valid
NTA, as the Board decided in Bermudez-Cota, a decision which all
circuits have followed as of this date, the government can still comply
with the Pereira requirement that a valid NTA must list the date and
time of a noncitizen’s hearing if it then issues a notice of hearing
(“NOH”) listing these details initially omitted in the NTA.41 Courts
37

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2) (1996) (“The term ‘removable’ means—(A) in the
case of an [noncitizen]not admitted to the United States, that the [noncitizen] is
inadmissible under section 1182 of this title, or (B) in the case of an [noncitizen]
admitted to the United States, that the [noncitizen] is deportable under section 1227
of this title”).
38
8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2019) (“Initiation of removal proceedings”); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (2019) (“At the conclusion of the proceeding the
immigration judge shall decide whether a [noncitizen] is removable from the United
States. The determination of the immigration judge shall be based only on the
evidence produced at the hearing”).
39
See Edzie, supra note 32, at 1, citing 8 U.S. Code § 1229.
40
Pereira v. Sessions,585U.S. 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018).
41
Matter of Bermudez-Cota,27 I&N Dec. 441. See Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913
F.3d 1158, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2019) petition for cert. pending, No. 19-475 (filed Oct.
7, 2019); Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2019) reh’g denied
(July 18, 2019) petition for cert. pending No.19-510 (filed Oct. 16, 2019); OrtizSantiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 963 (7th Cir. 2019); Ali v. Barr, 924 F.3d 983 (8th
Cir. 2019); Nkomo v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 930 F.3d 129, 132-134 (3d
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have referred to this as a two-step process of providing the noncitizen
with the information required.42Importantly, a noncitizen’s failure to
appear before the judge on either the date and time that is listed on the
NTA can result in an immigration judge ordering him removed in
absentia.43
Immigration judges’ decisions can then be appealed to the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA).44 Should a noncitizen disagree with the
both the immigration court’s and the Board’s decision on his case, he
may appeal to federal courts.45
B. Cancellation of Removal
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009-546, grants the U.S. Attorney
General the discretion to “cancel removal” and adjust the status of
certain noncitizens, if they meet certain statutory eligibility
requirements.46 Allowing noncitizens to request that the government
cancel their removal (i.e., their deportation from the country),is known
as a petition for cancellation of removal.
Despite what seems to be the harsh consequences of many
immigration laws, something still remains true: at least in theory,
cancellation of removal, allowing noncitizens to request that the

Cir. 2019); United States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350, 359-366 (4th Cir. 2019); PierrePaul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684, 688-691 (5th Cir. 2019); Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 935 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2019); Goncalves Pontes v. Barr, 938 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 2019); Lopez-Munoz v. Barr, 941 F.3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir. 2019).
42
See Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez & Capula-Cortes, 27 I&N Dec. 520
(BIA 2019)(holding that a deficient notice to appear lacking the time and place of a
noncitizen’s initial removal hearing is perfected when the subsequent notice of
hearing is sent to the noncitizen specifying the information.).
43
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5) (1996).
44
INA § 242 8 U.S.C §1252 (“Judicial review of orders of removal”); Reyes
Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S. 135 S. Ct. 2150, 1253 (2015).
45
8 U.S.C. § 1326 (d) (1996).
46
8 U.S.C.S. § 1229b (b) (1) (1996).
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government, in essence, cancel their removal, remains one of the most
generous forms of immigration relief available to noncitizens.47
Of course, however, the generosity of this law, is potentially
outweighed by the strict requirements noncitizens must meet and serve
to limit the number of people who can pursue this form of relief.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229, cancellation of removal is available to legal
permanent residents and non-legal permanent residents.48 referring to
individuals who are here as unauthorized immigrants or are present in
the United States with a visa, but have not applied to permanently live
in the United States.49
A legal permanent resident who has been placed in removal
proceedings must prove: (1) he was admitted to the country as a legal
permanent resident for at least five years; (2) he has continuously
resided in the United States for seven years, regardless of his status;
and (3) he has not been convicted of any crimes.50 Similarly, a nonlegal permanent resident must appear before an immigration judge and
establish:(1) he has been physically present in the United states for at
least ten years immediately preceding the date of application;(2) he
had good moral character during the period of continuous presences;
(3) he had not been convicted of certain offenses; and (4) his removal
would cause extreme and unusual hardship to his legal permanent
resident (“LPR”) or U.S. citizen spouse, parent or child.51
C. Stop-Time Rule
The same statute that grants the government the power to cancel
the removal of nonpermanent residents meeting the statutory
provisions delineated previously also provides that the continuous
physical presence requirement “shall be deemed to end . . . when the

47

Should an applicant be able to prove he
Legal permanent resident refers to
49
8 U.S.C.S. § 1229b.
50
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
51
INA § 240A(b)(1); 8 USC 1229 (b)(1).
48
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[noncitizen] is served a notice to appear under 1229(a).”52 This is
known as the stop-time rule.
To understand how this rule works, consider the following
example. Maria Sanchez, lived in the United States without leaving
from April 1, 2008 until 2018. In 2017, she received a Notice to
Appear telling her she should appear before an immigration judge.
Given that she has been in the United States since 2008, and in this
example, it is currently 2018, it seems clear that she met the 10-year
physical presence requirement that would allow her to request that the
government cancel her removal. However, Maria, cannot, in fact
request cancellation of removal. Although she has lived in the United
States for more than ten years, she stopped accumulating time towards
the 10 year requirement when she received the NTA. Therefore, the
government would consider her to have lived in the United States for
only nine years—the nine years she lived in the United States prior to
the government ordering her to appear before an immigration judge.
For quite some time, the government had been issuing incomplete
NTAs that did not specify all the details required by statute. Lower
courts reviewed challenges claiming that NTAs not containing the time
a place a noncitizen should appear before an immigration judge were
invalid for failing to abide by the requirements set forth by statute and
therefore could not be said to allow an immigration court to assert
jurisdiction over an individuals’ case. However, lower courts’ failure
to reach a consensus on this question ultimately led to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Pereira, where the Court examined a notice to
appear that merely “ordered [a nonresident] to appear before an
immigration judge in Boston on a date to be set at a time to be set.”53
D. Does a notice to appear vest jurisdiction with the immigration
court?
To fully understand Pereira’s implications, it is important to
understand immigrant advocates’ jurisdictional argument. Jurisdiction
52
53

8 U.S.C.S. § 1229 b(d).
Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2112 (2018).
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refers to a court’s adjudicatory capacity, which is, its subject-matter
jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction.54 The “‘first and fundamental
question’ of jurisdiction applies not only to the appellate courts, but
also to the ‘the courts from which the records comes[,]’ and it is one
that ‘the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not
otherwise suggested.’”55
Congress arguably established subject matter jurisdiction through
the INA which grants the Attorney General the authority and
responsibility to conduct removal proceedings,56 and directed that
“immigration judge[s] shall conduct” those proceedings.57
While the INA does not address how jurisdiction vests with the
immigration court, an Executive Office for Immigration Review
(“EOIR”) regulation addresses the issue stating that: “jurisdiction
vests, and proceedings before an Immigration Judge commence, when
a charging document is filed with the Immigration Court” by the
department. 58 The regulation continues by defining a “charging
document” as “the written instrument which initiates a proceeding
before an Immigration Judge” . . . “includ[ing] a Notice to Appear, a
Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge, and Notice of Intention to
Rescind and Request for Hearing . . . .”59 Since filing an NTA initiates
removal proceedings and by statute an immigration court vests
jurisdiction through the issuance of a charging document, which
includes an NTA, the immigration court can be said to vest
jurisdiction upon the filing of an NTA.60

54
55

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)(quoting Great
Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453 (1900)).
56
INA § 240 (2011).
57
In re Castro-Tum , 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (B.I.A. May 17, 2018) ;INA§
240(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1)(2006).
58
8 C.F.R. 1003.14(a).
59
8 C.F.R. 1003.13.
60
See Matter of Sanchez-Herbert, 26 I&N Dec. 43, 44 (BIA 2012)( finding that
“[o]nce a notice to appear has been properly filed, with the Immigration Court,
jurisdiction vests”).
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II. PEREIRA V. SESSIONS AND ITS IMPACT ON REMOVAL
The Supreme Court reviewed the issue of whether a notice to
appear that is issued to a noncitizen in removal proceedings triggers
the stop-time rule and would therefore make him ineligible to apply
for cancellation of removal.61 In Pereira v. Sessions, a Brazilian citizen
overstayed his visitor visa in the United States.62 On May 31, 2006, he
was served with a notice to appear by DHS.63 The notice indicated
Pereira had to appear before an immigration judge, but did not specify
a time or place for the hearing.64 More than one year later, the
immigration court mailed Pereira a notice listing his hearing for
October 31, 2007.65 However, the notice was sent to the wrong address
and he did not receive it.66 Pereira, not aware that he had a hearing
scheduled, did not attend the hearing and the immigration judge
ordered him to be removed in absentia.67 He did not learn of the in
absentia removal notice until 2013.68
The immigration judge rescinded the in absentia order and
reopened proceedings.69 The immigration judge denied the application
for cancellation of removal finding that the notice stopped the accrual
of continuous physical presence.70 The noncitizen then appealed his
case to the BIA. Relying on Matter of Camarillo, which held that
“service of a notice to appear triggers the ‘stop-time’ rule, regardless
of whether the date and time of the hearing have been included in the
document,” the BIA upheld the immigration judge’s decision.71 Again,
61

Pereira, 138 S. Ct. 2105 at 2112.
Id. at 2107.
63
Id. at 2112.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
62
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the noncitizen appealed, this time to the First Circuit, where his
petition for review was denied on the basis that, as an immigration
court, part of an agency, is owed deference in its interpretation of the
statute delineating the requirements of a valid notice to appear.72 The
case went to the Supreme Court to resolve a circuit split.73
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a document
labeled “notice to appear,” that does not specify the time and/or place
of the removal proceedings, triggers the stop-time rule.74 In an opinion
authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the Court held, 8 to 1, that “[a]
notice that does not inform a non-citizen when and where to appear for
removal proceedings is not a ‘notice to appear under section 1229 (a)’
and therefore does not trigger the stop-time rule.”75
The court reached its decision by looking at the statute listing the
requirements of a valid notice to appear. Under 8 U.S.C 1229(a), an
NTA is required to list “[t]he time and place the [removal] proceedings
will be held.”76 The Court then considered surrounding statutes to
understand the relationship between the statutory requirements of
notices to appear and those of provision requiring the opportunity to
secure counsel, for example.77 After an evaluation of the surrounding
statutes, including the statute indicating who the requirements for a
non-citizen to secure counsel, the Court concluded that it made
practical sense for the notice to be required to “specify the time and
place the noncitizen, and his counsel, must appear at the removal
hearing.”78 The Court reasoned its conclusion followed “inescapably
and unambiguously” from “the plain text, the statutory context, and
common sense.”79 Determining whether the Court’s decision was fact
specific, however, is something that is still being debated.
72

Id. at 2128.
Id. at 2113.
74
Id. at 2110.
75
Id. at 2107.
76
Pereira,138 S. Ct. at 2114, (quoting 8 U.S.C.1229(a)(1)(G)(i) (2006)).
77
Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2109.
78
Id. at 211415.
79
Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2018).
73
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A. Does Pereira have jurisdictional ramifications?
Justice Sotomayor arguably intended to implicate all immigration
courts’ jurisdiction explaining what constituted a valid NTA. While
seemingly clear at first glance, there has been much debate about
whether this is true.
As previously stated, immigrant advocates, proponents of an
expansive Pereira interpretation argue that “[a] notice that does not
inform a noncitizen when and where to appear for removal
proceedings is not a ‘notice to appear under section 1229 (a).’” The
argument is that “a document isn’t a notice to appear if it doesn’t have
a time and place on it, [and therefore]cannot be a charging document.
And without a valid charging document, jurisdiction never vests in the
immigration court.”80 The natural next question is just what type of
jurisdiction can an immigration court assert: is a court asserting
personal or subject matter jurisdiction when it serves an NTA?
In an unpublished opinion, the BIA stated that immigration courts,
like Article III courts must have both personal and subject matter
jurisdiction.81 However, under 8 C.F.R. 1003.14(a) “[j]urisdiction
vests, and proceedings before an immigration judge commence, when
a charging document is filed with the Immigration Court by
the Service.”82 This regulation concerns whether a particular case is
properly before an immigration court. The idea that a charging
document needs to be filed with an immigration court or else it lacks
authority to make decisions on the issues raised before it describes the
concept of subject-matter jurisdiction.83 This is the concept the
Supreme Court described saying that “courts have a duty to ensure that

80

Kit Johnson, Pereira v. Sessions: A Jurisdictional Surprise for Immigration
Courts, 50 Columbia Human Rights L. Review 1, 5 (2019).
81
Id. at 5 n. 4 (citing Marco v. United States, No. 1:09-cv-761, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 108337 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 12, 201 0).
82
8 C.F.R. 1003.14(a)(February 28,2003).
83
Johnson, supra note 81.
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their jurisdiction ‘defined and limited by statute, is not exceeded.’”84
Despite this seemingly clear language, scholars, courts, and even the
Board have all reached different conclusions regarding this question
on numerous occasions.
In response to the notion that the court never mentioned
jurisdiction, proponents of an expansive Pereira reading argue that a
narrow interpretation baldly ignores what the Court did say as the
court clearly spoke about 1229(a)’s requirements.85 The Court, in
Pereira, rejected the notion advanced by the government and dissent
indicating the statute is not worded in definitional terms, saying:
Section 1229(a)[] does speak in definitional terms, at least with
respect to the “ time and place at which the proceedings will be
held”: It specifically provides that the notice described under
paragraph (1) is “referred to as a ‘notice to appear,’” which in
context is quintessential definitional language. It then defines that
term as a “written notice” that , as relevant here, “specif[ies] the
time and place at which the [removal] proceedings will be held.”
Thus when the term notice to appear” is used elsewhere int eh
statutory section, including as the trigger for the stop-time rule, it
carries with is the substantive time-and-place criteria required by
1229(a).86
The entire passage is clearly discussing the requirements of 1229(a).87
Additionally, the majority opinion clearly stated that 1229 (a)’s
requirements are applicable to all notices to appear in response to the
Justice Alito’s argument that the statute is better understood as
defining what a “complete’ notice to appear should include rather than
what a defective notice to appear” deprives it of “essential character as

84

Id.
Hoffman, supra note 5, at 30.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 31.
85
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a notice to appear.”88 Even if incomplete, the notice to appear is still a
notice to appear.
1. Arguments in Favor of a Narrow Interpretation
On the other side of the spectrum, is the opinion that a defective
notice “ does not bear on the immigration court’s subject matter
jurisdiction” since Congress “has not expressly tethered the exercise of
jurisdiction for satisfaction of the separate statutory requirements for
notice to appear.”89 The reasoning employed in reaching such a
conclusion is that the notice to appear “is akin to a summons or
citation that is used in state and federal civil cases to notify civil
defendants that they have been sued or to the type of charging
document that is used in criminal proceedings.”90
Critics of a broad interpretation, including anything beyond the
context of removal cases rely on two main arguments. First, they
argue, the Supreme Court did not mention jurisdiction in its decision.
In other words, the Court did not hold that all notices to appear should
be invalidated when they do not list that date and time of the hearing;
and therefore, the case cannot be read so broadly. Additionally, courts
adopting this approach have emphasized that the Pereira Court went
out of its way to say it was only deciding a “narrow” question.91 In the
same vein, the government and lower courts have emphasized the
Court did not mention jurisdiction and therefore did not invalidate
Pereira’s removal order for lack of jurisdiction.92
Another main argument advocates for a narrow reading of Pereira
advance is referred to as the actual notice objection.93 They essentially
argue that if noncitizens receive actual notice of when and where the

88

Id.
Hoffman, supra note 5, at 41.
90
Id.
91
Hoffman, supra note 5, at 28.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 29.
89
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removal hearings will be held, Pereira does not apply.94 In doing so,
advocates distinguish many of the cases used to challenge removal
proceedings initiated through defective notices. While in Pereira, the
noncitizen never received actual notice because the notice was sent to
another address many noncitizens challenging their removal based on
defective notices, did, in fact receive their NTAs. The crux of the
actual notice argument is that in delineating that a valid NTA must
state the place and time, the Pereira Court was more concerned with
noncitizen’s receiving notice, than with a notice listing every item
listed in the statute.95 Many pre-Pereira cases upholding a two-step
notice process in which a noncitizen is served with an NTA and then
receives a notice of hearing listing the date and time have been cited
by advocates of a narrow Pereira reading illustrate courts worry more
about function than form in these cases.96
2. Arguments in Favor of a Broad Interpretation
The BIA, in an unpublished opinion, stated that immigration
courts, like Article III courts must have both personal and subject
matter jurisdiction.97 Under 8 C.F.R. 1003.14(a) “[j]urisdiction vests,
and proceedings before an immigration judge commence, when
a charging document is filed with the Immigration Court by
the Service.”98 This regulation concerns whether a particular case is
properly before an immigration court. The fact that a charging
document needs to be filed with an immigration court or else it lacks
authority to make decisions on the issues raised before it describes the
concept of subject-matter jurisdiction.99 This is the concept the
Supreme Court described saying that “courts have a duty to ensure that
94

Id.
Id.
96
Id.
97
Johnson, supra note 81, n. 4 citing Marco v. United States, No. 1:09-cv-761,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108337 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 12, 2010).
98
8 C.F.R. 1003.14(a) (2019).
99
Johnson, supra note 81, at 4.
95
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their jurisdiction ‘defined and limited by statute, is not exceeded.” 100
Nonetheless, scholars, courts, and even the Board have all reached
different conclusions regarding this question on numerous occasions.
B. The Board of Immigration Appeal’s Narrowing of Pereira in
Bermudez-Cota
Following Pereira, the Board issued a decision in Matter of
Bermudez-Cota limiting Pereira to its facts and therefore denying
challenges to immigration courts’ jurisdiction in removal cases when
defective notices were issued.101 In Bermudez-Cota, the non-citizen
was served with a notice to appear that did not include the time or
place of the hearing.102 Just over a week later, the immigration court
mailed him a notice of hearing that did include the date, time and place
of the hearing.103 At his final hearing, Bermudez-Cota moved to either
administratively close his proceedings or request a continuance to
apply for adjustment of status.104 The immigration judge denied both
the motion to administratively close the case and the application for
adjustment of status and instead issued Bermudez-Cota an order for
voluntary departure.105 Bermudez-Cota appealed the decision to the
BIA arguing that the immigration court did not assert jurisdiction
based on Pereira.106
The Board held that “a notice to appear that does not specify the
time and place of a noncitizen’s initial removal hearing vests an
Immigration Judge with jurisdiction over the removal proceedings and
meets the requirements of section 239(a) of the Act, so long as a notice
of hearing specifying this information is later sent to the [non100

Id.
Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I.&N. Dec. 441, 441, 2018 BIA LEXIS 31,
*1 (B.I.A. August 31, 2018).
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
101
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citizen].”107 The Board distinguished Bermudez-Cota’s situation from
the one in Pereira highlighting that Bermudez-Cota had received a
subsequent hearing notice unlike Pereira, and that Bermudez-Cota was
“ not seeking cancellation of removal, and the ‘stop-time rule,’[was
therefore] not at issue.”108 In reaching its conclusion that the
subsequent issuance of a hearing notice that lists the date, time, and
place of the hearing resolves potential jurisdictional issues involved
with a defective notice to appear, the Board relied on many decisions
that pre-date Pereira.109
Furthermore, the Board did not base its conclusion on any
statutory or regulatory authority.110 Rather, the court merely reasoned
that Pereira involved a “distinct set of facts,” which did not include a
subsequent notice of hearing.111 The Board made it clear that the Court
in Pereira, did not indicate the noncitizen’s removal hearing was
invalid or suggest that the proceedings should be terminated.112
Instead, the Pereira Court remanded the case for further
proceedings.113 Other than distinguishing Bermudez-Cota from
Pereira, however, the Board did not base its conclusion on the
jurisdictional issue in Pereira or any statute.114
This decision has been criticized for its reliance on circuit court
decisions issued prior to Pereira that embraced a “two-step” notice
process.115 Furthermore, the decision has also been criticized for its
reliance on the federal regulation governing NTAs rather than relying
on the relevant statute defining what constitutes a proper NTA.116

107

Id. at *16.
Id.
109
Hoffman, Geoffrey A., supra note 8, at 4.
110
Id.
111
Hoffman, Geoffrey A., supra note 8, at 3.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Hoffman, Geoffrey A., supra note 8, at 3.
115
Id. at 4.
116
Id.
108
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C. Federal Courts’ Rulings on Jurisdiction since Bermudez-Cota
To date, all courts of appeals except for the DC circuit have
considered whether an immigration court has jurisdiction when it
issues a defective or incomplete NTA and have concluded that, despite
Pereira’s holding, immigration courts do assert jurisdiction even with
incomplete NTAs.117 While consistent in their denial of the claims,
however, courts’ reasoning further complicates the issue.
For example, the Ninth Circuit, in Karingithi v. Whitaker,
emphasized that the immigration court’s jurisdiction is governed by
regulation and not by statute and highlighted how neither the Supreme
Court’s decision in Pereira nor the statutory definition of an NTA at §
1229(a) address jurisdiction.118 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
Pereira court relied upon the intersection of the statutory provisions
dealing with the stop-time rule and the definition of an NTA.
However, it found that the word “under” in the stop-time rule mattered
only to the substantive time-and place requirements mandated by §
1229(a) because that word “provides the glue that bonds the stop-time
rule to the substantive time-and-place requirements mandated by §
1229(a),”11932 but “no such statutory glue bonds the Immigration
Court’s jurisdiction to § 1229(a)’s requirements.” 120 Other circuits
have also found there is no statutory basis to hold that immigration
courts lack jurisdiction based on a defective NTA.
117

Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2019) petition for
cert. pending, No. 19-475 (filed Oct. 7, 2019); Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d
101, 112 (2d Cir. 2019) reh’g denied (July 18, 2019) petition for cert. pending
No.19-510 (filed Oct. 16, 2019); Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 963 (7th Cir.
2019); Ali v. Barr, 924 F.3d 983 (8th Cir. 2019); Nkomo v. Attorney Gen. of United
States, 930 F.3d 129, 132-134 (3d Cir. 2019); United States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350,
359-366 (4th Cir. 2019); Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684, 688-691 (5th Cir. 2019);
Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 935 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2019); Goncalves
Pontes v. Barr, 938 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2019); Lopez-Munoz v. Barr, 941 F.3d 1013,
1018 (10th Cir. 2019).
118
Karingithi, 913 F.3d at 1161
119
Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2117.
120
Karingithi, supra note, 118 at 1161.
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Courts’ confusion regarding the proper interpretation of Pereira,
is further highlighted by the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Santos- v.
Barr.121 Santos-Santos made a Pereira jurisdictional claim, arguing
that his in absentia order should be rescinded and reopened since it the
in absentia order was premised on a defective NTA.122 The NTA, did
not list the date, time, and place of the hearing and therefore, he
argued, the immigration judge had no jurisdiction to enter a removal
order.123 Santos also claimed that he never received an NTA nor notice
of hearing and that there was no evidence showing whether anyone did
in fact try to serve him with a notice of hearing.”124 The Sixth Circuit
nonetheless, rejected his jurisdictional challenge holding that Pereira
was distinguishable from his case for two reasons.125 First, Pereira
dealt with the narrow issue of whether the stop-time rule can be
triggered by an NTA lacking the time and place of the hearing.126
Secondly, Pereira dealt with statutory provisions that were not at issue
in Santos’s case.127
In stating that Pereira dealt with statutory provisions not at issue
in Santos’s case, however, the Sixth Circuit potentially erred. The
court apparently believed that the regulation and the governing statutes
referred to two different NTAs and stated: “it bears noting that the
Notice to Appear in 8 C.F. R. 1003.13-14. is different from the NTA in
8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1). 128 Therefore, courts’ inconsistent reasoning in
concluding a defective NTA does not deprive immigration courts of
jurisdiction should encourage attorneys to continue making the
challenge.
D. Seventh Circuit Precedent on Pereira Claims
121

Santos-Santos v. Barr, 917 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 488.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 489.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 490.
122
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The Seventh Circuit has addressed issues other than whether a
Pereira claim, that an incomplete notice is invalid and cannot assert
jurisdiction, can be made. For example in, Herrera-Garcia v. Barr, the
court considered when the claim could be made.129 Herrera-Garcia had
been denied asylum along with the adjoining claims of withholding of
removal and CAT relief, but during the petition for review from the
Seventh Circuit, he filed a motion to reconsider before the BIA.130 In
his motion, he asserted that his case implicated Pereira, §.131 In doing
so, Herrera-Garcia essentially argued that Pereira should be
interpreted broadly to include claims outside the stop-time rule context
to preclude agency’s jurisdiction over his removal proceedings. The
Board, however, denied his motion on two grounds: (1) that the
motion was untimely, and that (2) it failed on the merits. HerreraGarcia filed a second petition to review the denied motion to
reconsider he filed.132
In reviewing his new motion, the Seventh Circuit consolidated his
two appeals and ultimately rejected Herrera-Garcia’s jurisdictional
argument.133 Herrera-Garcia explained he delayed filing his motion to
reconsider because Pereira was still pending and argued that he should
not have been required to file the motion to reconsider during that
time.134 However, the Seventh Circuit reasoned he could have
nonetheless, “raised the issue under consideration in Pereira with the
Immigration Judge of the Board earlier or at least requested a stay
until the case was decided.” 135
There is an argument that the Seventh Circuit, in stating that
Herrera-Garcia should have filed his motion to reconsider while
Pereira was pending ignored the fact that, as noted by Justice
129

Herrera-Garcia v. Barr, 918 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 560.
131
Id. at 561.
132
Id. at 562.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 561.
135
Id. at 563.
130
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Kennedy in Pereira, at least six courts of appeals before Pereira had
viewed the stop-time rule differently, and moreover, the Supreme
Court had interpreted the language to define what constituted a proper
NTA.136
IV. SEVENTH CIRCUIT- ORTIZ-SANTIAGO V. BARR.
The Seventh Circuit, in a decision authored by Judge Diane
Wood, disagreed with its sister courts’ narrow interpretation of
Pereira.137 In Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, the petitioner was a 50-year-old
Mexican citizen who resided in the United States continuously since
1999 without legal status.138 In October 2015, the petitioner was
arrested for driving without a license.139 Shortly after, he received a
Notice to Appear stating he was removable because he entered the
United States without being admitted or paroled.140 However, the
notice did not list any time or date for his appearance, but merely
stated, as in Pereira that he was to appear before an immigration judge
in Chicago at a date and time “to be set.”141 Eventually, Ortiz received
a “Notice of Hearing” indicating he was to appear before an
immigration judge on November 12, 2015 at 10:30 am.142
At his hearing, Ortiz-Santiago conceded he was removable, but
sought cancellation of removal based, in part, on his continuous
presence in the United States for more than ten years.143 The
immigration judge denied his cancellation and Ortiz-Santiago

136

Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018).
Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2019).
138
Id. at 958.
139
Ortiz-Santiago, 924 F.3d 956, 958.
140
Id. Paroled refers to an extraordinary measure, sparingly utilized to permit
an otherwise inadmissible unauthorized immigrant to enter the United States for a
temporary period due to an urgent humanitarian reason or for a significant public
benefit. An unauthorized immigrant may also request parole from a U.S. government
agency or the Department of State.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
137
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appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals.144 While his appeal
was pending, the Supreme Court decided Pereira. 145 About two
months after Pereira, but before the Board made its final decision on
his case, Ortiz filed a motion to remand with the Board, arguing that
because the notice he received did not include the date and time, it was
not a proper charging document.146 The Board denied his motion to
remand and affirmed the immigration judge’s decision.147 Ortiz then
appealed to the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the immigration court did
not have jurisdiction over his case due to the defective notice.148
The Seventh Circuit agreed with Ortiz-Santiago that the NTA was
defective, but denied his petition for review, rejecting his argument
that the issuance of a defective NTA meant the immigration court had
not vested jurisdiction over his case.149 The court concluded there was
no jurisdictional issue on the straightforward basis that Congress has
not linked the immigration court’s jurisdiction to the notice to appear.
The court explained this concept as follows:
The fact that the Executive Office for Immigration Review of the
Department of Justice purported to describe when ‘jurisdiction’
vests in a case before an immigration court is neither here nor there.
. . . While an agency may adopt rules and processes to maintain
order, it cannot define the scope of its power to hear cases. . . .
[W]hen the agency creates the rules for its adjudicatory proceedings,
it must act within the limits that Congress gave it.150
Not considering the question before it one of jurisdiction, the court
stated defective NTAs instead presented a question of whether a

144

Id. at 958-959.
Id. at 958.
146
Id. at 959.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 966.
150
Id. at 963.
145
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claims-processing rule had been violated.151 The court distinguished
jurisdictional rules claims processing rules relying on Gonzalez v.
Thaler, where the Supreme Court reasoned “truly jurisdictional rules”
govern “a court’s adjudicatory authority” while “non-jurisdictional
ones do not.”152 Applying the Gonzalez principle, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that “the requirement that a Notice include within its four
corners the time, date , and place of the removal proceedings” should
not be interpreted to mean jurisdiction in the “sense that complete
diversity or the existence of federal question is for a district court.”153
The court defined a claims-processing rule as one “that seeks to
promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties
take certain procedural steps at certain specified times.”154
By referring to the issue in the case as one of claims-processing
rather than jurisdictional, the court allowed petitioners the opportunity
to terminate their case, but only if a timely objection was raised. The
court stated that if a petitioner failed to raise a timely objection, the
failure to comply may “be waived or forfeited by the opposing
party.”155
Considering the case as one of claim-processing, the court then
turned to the issues of whether the lack of timely objection constituted
such forfeiture, whether doing so at the time would have been fruitless
given the existing law from federal circuit courts, and whether the
major legal change that the Pereira decision constituted allowed for
the late raising of such objection.156 The court concluded that there
was “no reason . . . to relieve Ortiz-Santiago of the forfeiture” because
in Ortiz-Santiago’s case there were signs a meritorious argument could
have been raised.”157

151

Id. at 962-963.
Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012).
153
Ortiz-Santiago, 924 F.3d 956, 963.
154
Id. (citing Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435, (2011)).
155
Id. at 963.
156
Id. at 964.
157
Id.
152
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The court rejected the Government’s argument that there were
two NTAs, one being referenced by statute and one in an EOIR
regulations as “absurd.”158 Furthermore, the court highlighted
Bermudez-Cota “brushed too quickly over the Supreme Court’s
rationale in Pereira and tracked the dissenting opinion rather than the
majority.”159
While the distinction between a claims-processing rule and a
jurisdictional one may seem simply definitional, the Supreme Court
has frequently struggled with distinguishing between the two.160 For
example, the Court considered whether the “fifteen or more
employees” standard to hold an employer liable for a Title VII claims
was jurisdictional and held that it was not.161 The Court, in other cases
established that claims processing rules are those governing “ the
presentation and processing of claims.”162 In all cases that reached the
Supreme Court, the determining factor of whether a rule was one of
claims-processing or jurisdiction was whether Congress intended to
treat the rule as jurisdictional.163Seventh Circuit’s decision in OrtizSantiago, several other courts of appeals have adopted its reasoning
and held that NTA requirements are claims-processing rules.164
V. WHY ORTIZ- SANTIAGO V. BARR WAS INCORRECTLY DECIDED
158

Id. at 962.
Id.
160
See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010) (noting that
“the distinction between jurisdictional conditions and claim-processing rules
can be confusing in practice” and that “[c]ourts—including this Court—have
sometimes mischaracterized claim processing rules or elements of a cause of
action as jurisdictional limitations”).
161
See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503 (2006).
162
Union Pacific R.R. v. Bd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm.
of Adjustment, 558 U.S. 61, 71 (2009).
163
Hoffman, supra note 5, at 41.
164
See Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684, 688-691 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that
8 CFR § 1003.14 is a claim-processing rule but upholding two-step process); United
States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350, 359-366 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that the regulation
is an “internal docketing rule” rather than “a limit on an immigration court’s
‘jurisdiction’ or authority to act”).
159
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1. Claiming Pereira Does not Implicate Jurisdiction Defies Sound
Statutory Interpretation.
As previously mentioned, the argument that a defective NTA does
not present jurisdictional concerns is largely based on the reading of
the statute and regulations governing removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C.
1229 delineates the criteria for the “[i]nitiation of removal
proceedings.”165 The Section provides that “[i]n removal proceedings .
. . written notice . . . shall be given in person to the [noncitizen] . . .
specifying,” among other things “the time and place at which the
proceedings will be held.”166 Importantly, Section 1229 does not
address how jurisdiction vests in with the immigration court and,
therefore, the argument is that “Congress has not ‘directly spoken to’
that ‘precise question.”167 Given the ambiguity in Section 1229,
however, an immigration court’s interpretation of the statute would be
given deference by a reviewing court and in fact, the agency, answered
this question in sections 8 C.F.R. §1003.14 and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13.168
Section 1003.14 provides: “[j]urisdiction vests, and proceedings
before an Immigration Judge commence, when a charging document is
filed with the Immigration Court by the Service.169 The statute goes on
to define a charging document as a “written instrument which initiates
a proceeding before an immigration judge.”170 The language of
Section 1003.14 is in line with what the Supreme Court has declared
to clearly refer to jurisdiction. Without evidence supporting otherwise,
it is evident the Seventh Circuit simply ignored the clear indication
Congress intended a notice to appear to serve as a way for the
immigration court to vest jurisdiction. Congress organized the code
165

8 U.S.C § 1229 (2006).
8 U.S.C § 1229(a)(1) (G)(j) (2006).
167
United States v. Rivas-Gomez, No. 2:18-cr-566, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
111931, at *9 (D. Utah July 3, 2019) (citing Chevron v. 467 U.S. at 842).
168
Id.
169
Id.at *10.
170
8 C.F.R. § 1003.13 (1997).
166
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logically. The initiation of proceedings must come first, followed by
the nature and carrying out of the proceedings. Therefore, 8 U.S.C.
1229 (a) is most reasonably understood to refer to jurisdiction as
opposed to claims-processing.
Furthermore, Pereira only having precedential force for
cancellation cases cannot defend the inconsistency that courts’
approach necessarily entails: a notice cannot be insufficient solely for
purposes of triggering the stop-time rule but satisfactory for every
other purpose. The approach defies reason and cannot be goes against
long-established rules of statutory construction.
Considering the statutory interpretation argument, it is not
surprising advocates for an expansive Pereira reading would want
Pereira to have subject matter jurisdiction implications.171 At least in
regards to Article III courts, subject matter jurisdiction issues are
considered non-waivable, meaning that subject matter jurisdiction can
be raised at any time during the trial of the case, or even afterwards on
direct appeal.172 Additionally, federal courts must confirm there is
subject matter jurisdiction and, if they find it lacking, dismiss sua
sponte, regardless of whether the parties raise it on their own. 173
Some scholars, however, consider that treating Pereira as a
subject matter jurisdiction problem overlooks how defects in subject
matter jurisdiction of Article III or Article I cannot be attacked
collaterally.174 Since subject matter jurisdiction cannot be attacked
collaterally, bringing Pereira challenges could only benefit noncitizens
with pending or future removal orders. If NTAs, in fact, do not
implicate subject matter jurisdiction, then the next question should be
whether an immigration court asserts personal jurisdiction over an
individual when it serves an NTA on a noncitizen.
While treating a defective notice issue as one implicating
personal jurisdiction might allow collateral attacks on final

171

Hoffman, supra note 5, at 38.
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
172
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judgements, the argument assumes a defective NTA implicates some
form of jurisdiction in the first place.175
Beyond their failure to give proper regard to the clear language in
the decision, courts that insist Pereira only has precedential force for
cancellation cases cannot defend the inconsistency that their approach
necessarily entails: that a notice would be insufficient solely for
purposes of triggering the stop time rule but satisfactory for every
other purpose. That approach defies reason and cannot be squared with
long established rules of statutory construction.
A claims-processing rule, on the other hand, as discussed earlier,
is one referring to the way courts carry out their daily administrative
tasks. Supreme Court precedent in employment law, indicates
1229(a)’s requirements are more like claims-processing rules and are
not jurisdictional.176 Specifically, in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., a case
the Seventh Circuit cited in support of its holding that defective
notices violate claims-processing rules, the Court held employers’
liability being limited to fifteen or more employees in Title VII claims
was not jurisdictional.177 The Arbaugh court further noted the dividing
line between a jurisdictional and a claims-processing rule is
determined by looking to whether Congress expressly indicated a rule
should be treated as jurisdictional.178
The idea that 1229(a)’s requirements are more like claimsprocessing rules is potentially strengthened by the Court’s decision in
another employment law case decided one year after Pereira. In Fort
Bend County v. Davis, the Court considered whether Title VII’s charge
filing precondition to a suit is a jurisdictional question.179 The statute
175

Id.
Arbaugh v. Y& H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503 (2006).
177
Id.
178
See Id. at 515-516 (noting that it the legislature “clearly states that threshold
limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants
will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue. But when
Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts
should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” (footnote
omitted)(citations omitted)).
179
139 S. Ct. 1843, 1846 (2019).
176
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clearly states that before a claimant can file a Title VII employment
discrimination case in court, the complainant must exhaust his
administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.180 The Court explained that the charge-filing
requirement, while mandatory, does not implicate the court’s
jurisdiction. 181
Proponents’ of a Pereira interpretation that does not include
jurisdiction have, of course, done their homework and correctly relied
on Supreme Court precedent delineating what is or is not a claimsprocessing rule, even though none of the cases involve statutes or
regulations governing immigration cases. However, these same
proponents have failed to reconcile the employment law cases
distinguishing claims-processing rule violations from jurisdictional
ones with Supreme Court precedent that is more clearly related to
Pereira’s interpretation. The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that
due to the high stakes involved in the deportation of noncitizens,
which can be considered the “equivalent of banishment or exile, ”182
courts have recognized the need to construe statutes in favor of the
noncitizen.183 Clearly, proponents of allowing immigration courts to
assert jurisdiction with improper notices are not taking this approach.
Overall, while the Seventh Circuit correctly ruled the notice
served on Ortiz-Santiago was defective, its conclusion that this was a
matter of claims-processing rather than jurisdiction is flawed for at
least two reasons. First, the court ignored cannons of statutory
construction requiring the court to consider the title of Section 1229,
delineating how removal hearings are initiated, as well as well as the
180

Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)).
Id. at 1849-51.
182
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 (2018)(reiterating that
deportation is “particularly severe penalty,” which may be of greater concern to a
convicted [noncitizen] than ‘any potential jail sentence.’”).
183
Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (finding that in using the term “more than
once,” the aim of 8 U.S.C.S. § 155(a) was to deport persons who commit a crime
and are sentenced, commit another crime, and are sentenced again rather than to
deport a noncitizen who had been convicted of the murder of two different persons
on one occasion).
181

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol15/iss1/10

32

Gomez: Jurisdiction Means Jurisdiction Not Claims-Processing: the Sevent

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 15

Fall 2019

idea that Courts are to give deference to an agency’s interpretation of a
statute or regulation.184 Furthermore, the court ignored Supreme Court
precedent requiring the statute indicating what constitutes a valid NTA
and the regulation governing when jurisdiction vests, to be read in
favor of the noncitizen.185 While the Seventh Circuit’s decision has
provided immigration attorneys with an avenue to challenge
immigrants’ removal hearings, it should nonetheless reconsider its
reasoning as this could lead to a slippery slope in which our
government is allowed to continue violating immigrants’ due process
rights. Unless Congress changes the governing statutes or the Supreme
Court overrules Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, where the court held statutes
should be read in favor of the noncitizen186
2. The Seventh Circuit’s reliance on the “Gonzalez principle” is
improper.
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the “line of authority”
upon which it relied to reach this conclusion “arose in the context of
the courts rather than agencies” but nevertheless found “the principle a
useful one here as well.”187 There is reason to doubt whether the
“Gonzalez principle” applies here, to an agency rather than an Article
III court.
The Supreme Court, in City of Arlington v. F.C.C., addressed
the question of “whether a court must defer under Chevron to an
agency’s interpretation of a statutory ambiguity that concerns the
scope of the agency's statutory authority (that is, its jurisdiction).” 188
The Court ultimately decided a court must defer to an agency’s
interpretation . To answer the question before it, the Supreme Court
noted the meaningful differences between “jurisdictional” and
184

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
See Fort Bend County, supra note 180, at 1846.
186
Id.
187
Ortiz-Santiago, 924 F.3d at 963.
188
City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 296-97 (2013).
185
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“nonjurisdicitonal questions in the judicial context, but not necessarily
for agencies. The Court also noted that “[t]he misconceptipn that there
are for Chevron purposes separate ‘jurisdictional’ questions on which
no deference is due derives perhaps, from a reflexive extension to
agencies of the very real division between the jurisdictional and
nonjurisdictional that is applicable to the courts.” 189 Essentially, the
Supreme Court explained that “[w]here Congress has established a
clear line the agency cannot go beyond it; and where Congress has
established an ambiguous line, the agency can go no further than the
ambiguity will fairly allow.” 190 In applying the latter rule, a court
should not question whether the question presented is “jurisdictional.”
191
For if the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute,’ that is the end of the matter.”192
Here, the relevant statutes sections 1229 and 1229(a) are
ambiguous as to when jurisdiction vests with an immigration
court. While the Seventh Circuit disagrees, the Attorney General filled
a gap to address an ambiguity in Section 1229 with the promulgation
of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13, 1003.14, and 1239.1. There is no reason why
the Attorney General interpreting the commencement of immigration
proceedings as a jurisdictional question is not “a permissible
construction of the statute.”193 Therefore, because this issue relates
specifically to the Attorney General’s “interpretation of a statutory
ambiguity concern[ing] the scope of [his] authority (that is, its
jurisdiction,” the conclusion that jurisdiction vests when a charging
document is filed with the immigration court properly follows. 194
While it is true there has been disagreement and confusion over
what truly constitutes a jurisdictional rule, the Supreme Court has not
189

Id. at 297.
Id. at 307.
191
Id.
192
Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842).
193
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
194
City of Arlington, supra, note 185, at 296-97.
190
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addressed the nature of NTA’s in immigration law. Pereira only
addressed whether the NTA triggered the stop-time rule and did not
specifically state whether the NTA implicates jurisdiction. Therefore,
despite other circuits agreeing with the Seventh Circuit, until the
Supreme Court reviews whether NTAs assert jurisdiction, the
argument that the issue is one of jurisdiction as opposed to claimsprocessing remains viable.
Recent Seventh Circuit decisions have followed Ortiz-Santiago in
ruling that incomplete notices are claims-processing violations.195
However, at least one court has considered Ortiz-Santiago’s reliance
on Gonzalez misguided because Gonzalez involved a jurisdictional
challenge in an Article III court and not an agency as in OrtizSantiago.196 While the one court to criticize the Seventh Circuit’s
holding that defective notices are the result of claims-processing rules,
and not jurisdiction, was a district court, the analysis makes clear the
distinction between a claims-processing rule and jurisdictional one are
not clear.
In United States v. Rivas-Gomez, the petitioner, a citizen of
Mexico, entered the United States without authorization on June of
1997.197 On June 6, 2002, Rivas-Gomez received a Notice to
Appear.198 On or around June 13, 2002, Rivas-Gomez received a
“Notice of Hearing in Removal Proceedings” indicating that RivasGomez had been scheduled for MASTER hearing before the
Immigration Court on July 15, 2002 at 8:30 am at a courtroom in
Lancaster, California.199 Mr. Rivas-Gomez was ordered removed at
that hearing, but then he re-entered the country.200 The Government
195

See supra note 165.
United States v. Rivas-Gomez, No. 2:18-cr-566, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
111931, at *1 (D. Utah July 3, 2019).
197
Id. at *1.
198
Id.
199
Id.at *2.
200
Id. at *19.
196
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alleged that Mr. Rivas-Gomez’ re-entry after being removed was
illegal.201 Mr. Rivas -Gomez argued for the dismissal of the illegal reentry charge because the charge was based on the 2002 notice to
appear that could not vest jurisdiction when it did not include all of the
information necessary to do so.202
The United States District Court for the District of Utah noted
how the Seventh Circuit had conceded it was relying on a line of
authority arising “in the context of the courts rather than agencies.” 203
The district court continued its critique of Ortiz-Santiago noting how
the court did not provide any statutory or case precedent for relying on
that same rationale.204 The district court held the issue presented was
one of jurisdiction and not claims-processing, relying on City of
Arlington.205
2. Practical Implications
The consequences of Pereira, the Seventh Circuit failed to
consider in Ortiz-Santiago are severe: in the months following the
Pereira decision, the backlog of immigration cases grew from 700,000
to over 800,000.206 It is very possible that by holding the issue is one
of claims-processing, the incomplete notices will continue to be
distributed and therefore further increase this backlog. Since almost
one hundred percent of the cases were initiated by invalid notices to
appear there is an argument that they should all be terminated for lack
of jurisdiction.207
201

Id. at *2.
Id. at *2-3 (citations and quotations omitted).
203
Id. at *17.
204
Id.
205
Id. at *15-16.
206
Compare Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRACT IMMIGRATION,
https/perma.cc/BND9-RNGG(data up to May 2018), with
http://trac.syr.edu/phtptools/immigraiton/court_backlog/[https://perma.cc/2E2R73NP9](data through November 2018).
207
Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2111(citing transcript).
202
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To address the government’s potential concern: while it may
seem that all non-citizens would immediately be relieved from
removal, it would be relatively easy for the Department of Homeland
Security to issue new, complete notices to appear.208 The fill- in the
blanks information on the form-including the respondent’s name,
address, and why they are subject to removal can easily be copied onto
complete notices to appear that comply with the requirements listed in
Pereira.209 In fact there is a computer system that would make this
even easier.210 However, as previously mentioned, these arguments
have been ignored by all circuits that have reviewed Pereira
jurisdictional claims.
Therefore, what is left for immigration attorneys to do on the
jurisdictional question is to attempt to distinguish as best they can the
case they are presenting to the judge from those decided by several
circuits already. For example, in some of the federal court decisions,
the NTA at issue did not include the time and date of the hearing but
did include the place.211 Therefore, an attorney could argue that
lacking the place of hearing was not at issue in Pereira and should not
208

Rivas-Gomez, No. 2:18-cr-566, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111931, at *16-17.
Id.
210
Id.
211
Some U.S. courts of appeals decisions do explicitly state that the
respondent argued the NTA was defective for not including the time or place of the
hearing. See Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2019) reh'g denied
(July 18, 2019) petition for cert. pending No.19-510 (filed Oct. 16, 2019); Ali v.
Barr, 924 F.3d 983, 986 (8th Cir. 2019); Nkomo v. Attorney Gen. of United States,
930 F.3d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 2019). None of the cases, however, discusses the
immigration court address requirement in 8 CFR § 1003.15 so it does not appear that
the noncitizens in these cases argued that the regulations do require the NTA to list
the place of the hearing for jurisdiction to vest even if they do not require the NTA to
list the time and date. On other hand, other U.S. court of appeals state that the
noncitizen argued that the NTA was defective for not including “the time and date”
but are silent as to place. For example, Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1160
(9th Cir. 2019) petition for cert. pending, No. 19-475 (filed Oct. 7, 2019) says,
“Importantly, the regulation does not require that the time and date of proceedings
appear in the initial notice.” See also Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684, 688691 (5th
Cir. 2019); United States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350, 359-366 (4th Cir. 2019); SorianoMendosa v. Barr, 768 F. App’x 796, 802 (10th Cir. 2019).
209
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immediately preclude a jurisdictional claim in the case before them at
the moment.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ortiz-Santiago has
unquestionably helped immigrant advocates terminate the removal
proceedings of many immigrants. However, a problem remains with
the framework the Seventh Circuit has set forth. As this article has
discussed, the court incorrectly assumed that the jurisdictional
argument is completely implausible. Secondly, the court’s reliance on
a case pertaining to Article III courts rather than agencies, such as an
immigration court, is improper. Lastly, in easily dismissing the issues
as one of claims processing, the court fails to account for the practical
implications its decision will have.
The difference between a claims-processing rule and jurisdictional
one may seem to be a mere technicality, however, the distinction
matters. It matters because the distinction could determine whether a
noncitizen could challenge a government’s error at virtually any
stage of litigation, or within a given time period.
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